India and Pakistan should be at the top of Obama's 'to-do' list

Even before Barack Obama's foreign policy team has been sworn in, an ugly new problem has been added to the president-elect's international "to-do" list.

It is the deteriorating relationship between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the violent assault on India's commercial capital, Mumbai. At least five intelligence services — of the United States, Britain, Israel, India and Pakistan — are trying to determine the originators of the attack. If, as seems possible, they prove to be of Pakistani origin and direction, recent promising overtures to ameliorate long-standing hostility between India and Pakistan would be blown off the negotiating table.

There are more serious possible consequences. Public sentiment in India is demanding strong retaliatory action against Pakistan. President-elect Obama has said India has the "sovereign right" to go after terrorists who attacked it. The New Delhi government is facing strong criticism from its citizens for alleged incompetence in handling the assault. Officials have resigned. Elections loom.

If this crisis, and its attendant politics, should trigger new warfare between India and Pakistan, Pakistan would be distracted from its military action against Taliban and al-Qaida forces that operate from sanctuary along the rugged Pakistan-Afghan border. Pakistan's military would regroup to meet the threat across its border from India. This would be a welcome scenario for al-Qaida and some of its Taliban allies and a setback for American and NATO-nation forces in Afghanistan at war with them.

So far, the finger of suspicion about the Mumbai attackers has been pointed at Lashkar-e-Taiba, a jihadist militant group ostensibly banned in Pakistan but once enjoying the support of Pakistani intelligence forces for action against India in disputed Kashmir. Interrogation of the sole known survivor of the small Mumbai attack group suggests that the attackers were youthful foot-soldiers who must have been trained and directed and supported by more sophisticated officers. This was an operation long in the planning that required reconnaissance, training, money, excellent communications.

Questions linger. Were there prepositioned aides who reported that some security measures at hotels had been relaxed? How could the attackers carry in small boats enough weaponry, explosives and provisions to hold off security forces for three days? How could the attackers locate so swiftly, and simultaneously, widespread targets in a city of 13 million people? How could they pinpoint a Jewish community center of which most citizens of the city were unaware?