Rethinking civilian aid in Afghanistan and its implications

With the Obama administration's decision to begin reducing America's military presence in Afghanistan, it is time to rethink the civilian effort there as well.

Last April, sitting in a converted cargo container at the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul — sandbags slapped against the sides to protect against incoming rockets — I talked with aid veterans about their work. Their commitment was impressive, but so were their concerns about the constraints under which they are forced to operate.

The job of helping Afghans build a state with functioning public services and institutions answering to an engaged civil society is plenty hard. Pumping vast amounts of money quickly — $4 billion this year — through a corrupt and fragile government doesn't make it easier. Nor do Washington's expectations, micromanagement and sense of urgency.

In the last 18 months, the United States Agency for International Development, or USAID, has increased its staff in Afghanistan to almost 400 people from 100 as part of a civilian "uplift" complementing President Obama's 2009 military surge. They manage a $9 billion portfolio of projects — from construction of roads and transmission lines to health and small-business development — being carried out by 26,000 Afghans and 6,000 people from other nations, all working at some risk. Since 2003, USAID has lost 385 people, mostly Afghans; some 600 more have been wounded. The program averages 58 attacks a month; as a consequence, tight security restrictions limit travel to the field and contact with Afghan partners.

USAID has been faulted repeatedly for its oversight of its operations, and there is no shortage of interested parties to do the faulting. In Kabul, staff members answer to five ambassadors or their equivalents, and five oversight agencies — inspectors general (I.G.s) for USAID and the State Department, a special I.G. for Afghanistan, the General Accounting Office and the Wartime Contracting Commission. Two interagency task forces in Kabul and one in Washington, the State Department representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan, require regular (and irregular) reporting. On average, two congressional delegations visit every week, each with its own set of questions. The complaint that responding to inquiries cuts into time needed for design, implementation and monitoring is not surprising.