Obama undercutting war plan in Afghanistan

In November 2009, when I visited Afghanistan, I thought I understood what our military could achieve with a troop surge.

But these days, I'm at a loss to figure out what we are doing, or what President Obama wants to achieve there. A military strategy whose chances were already slim has been undercut by his ambivalence about the war.

The White House struggle to evolve an Afghan policy — and the civilian-military tensions that emerged from it — is laid out in detail in Bob Woodward's latest White House-insiders-tell-all book, "Obama's Wars." Obama finally endorsed much of what the military asked for, sending 30,000 new troops to the conflict. But his determination to set a July 2011 date for the start of a troop drawdown undercuts the surge.

The president understands why Afghanistan still matters: If the Taliban regain control, the country will once more become a haven for Islamic terrorists. More important, a Taliban victory will rebound on neighboring Pakistan, where al-Qaida leaders are hiding and where local jihadis want the country's nuclear bombs.

But — as Woodward's account makes clear — Obama's approach undercuts the core of the military's strategy: the effort to shift the momentum so that the Taliban (and most Afghans) didn't assume their victory was inevitable.

From the military's perspective, a shift in momentum required more than adding 30,000 U.S. soldiers or waiting for a new Afghan army to take up the struggle. It meant galvanizing Afghans from the bottom up to resist the insurgents.

In late 2009, U.S. commanders hoped to encourage tribal leaders, village elders and district officials to stand up to the Taliban, by protecting them, providing aid funds and enticing low- and mid-level Taliban to defect. Special Forces would help.

The central idea: If Afghans believed the Americans were committed, many would switch sides to join the likely winner, as they have done throughout their history. In 2001, many warlords abandoned the Taliban after its first big loss.

Once the momentum had shifted, it would become easier to entice some Taliban factions to accept roles in the constitutional government. And once Pakistan sensed our strong commitment, its military and intelligence agencies may stop undercutting efforts in Afghanistan.

No question, this strategy faced tremendous challenges and would have been far easier to implement in 2003 than in 2009. But it was blown off course before it was fully tested, by Obama's announcement of the deadline.