Iraq's civil war does not have to be a cataclysmic one

Over the past few years, the Iraq war has morphed from a war of liberation against Saddam into a civil conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. And when you look at this civil conflict — or civil war if you want to call it that — you see how typical it is of many of the civil wars we've seen in the world over the past six decades. Over that time, there have been 225 civil wars, and many of them have featured the same sort of insurgency and counterinsurgency, the same ethnic feuding and the same pattern of elections intermingled with violence that we see in Iraq today.

American policymakers and think-tank Johnnies have not really looked at Iraq in the broader context of these other conflicts. That's in part because when Americans think of civil war, we tend to think of our own Civil War, which was utterly atypical. It's also because American experts were almost all trained to think about wars between nations, even though civil wars are nine times more common.

If, however, you do happen upon the Journal of Peace Research, where specialists do write about civil wars, you find that their broad perspective helps you see Iraq in clear and refreshing ways.

It's interesting to know, for example, that the median civil war lasts about six years. It's also interesting to know that most civil wars start, as Iraq's did, because of a power vacuum at the top. When a country's central government becomes ineffective, as Iraq's did after the toppling of Saddam, groups begin to grab for power and resources. (Civil wars are much more likely in countries with oil or other mineral wealth.)

The leaders of insurgent armies certainly magnify ethnic grievances as part of their grab for spoils, but sectarian hatred usually isn't sufficient to start civil wars. These wars are started by local elites that are essentially making an investment. They decide to commit violence now in the hopes of grabbing great wealth later. The people who do the killing might be whipped up by ethnic grievances, but the people who lead civil wars are usually rational and greedy.

Once a war starts, the length of the war is influenced by how strong and effective the central government is. If the central government is strong enough to fight back against insurgents, demonstrate resolve in the face of setbacks and also bribe insurgent leaders into joining the establishment, then the war can be cut short. If the central government is weak or corrupt, or if it reacts to the insurgency with excessive brutality, then the war drags on.

This is why it is essential that the United States remain in Iraq until we are sure the central government is strong.