After reviewing records at Utah's Dugway Proving Ground, Pentagon inspectors warn that three Army reconnaissance systems — designed to detect nuclear, biological or chemical attack contamination — have a major problem.

The equipment, and the vehicles that carry it, might not operate in the contaminated areas they are supposed to detect. They failed some tests, and inspectors could not determine if corrective upgrades were ever made or tested before the systems were put in the field.

In addition, inspectors said the Army also did not verify that Comanche and Apache helicopters, Stryker armored vehicles and some in-development systems could survive and operate in such contaminated areas, as intended by war plans, even though the Army's deputy chief of staff ordered such verification and testing five years ago.

"As a result, the risk for loss of life and equipment could be significantly increased through the use of mission-essential systems that may not be fully survivable or sustainable in contaminated environments," states a March 28 report by the U.S. Army Audit Agency obtained by the Deseret Morning News.

A letter from that agency to the newspaper says different levels of the Army are still debating what action to take to rectify the problems.

Until that internal debate ends, the Army has denied a formal Freedom of Information Act request by the newspaper for a copy of the report. However, the Morning News was able to obtain a copy despite that denial.

The report says inspectors decided to review records for six major weapons systems to determine if the Army had complied with a directive issued in 2000 to ensure that "all mission-essential systems were capable of surviving the nuclear, biological and chemical environments in which they may operate."

The report concluded, "Mission-essential Army systems weren't fully assessed for survivability and operation."

Inspectors wrote that they found that three of the six systems — all of which were designed to detect battlefield contamination — had actually failed tests, and they could find no evidence that they ever had been upgraded. They said the three other systems never had specific, measurable survivability criteria developed to allow testing.

Systems that failed to meet key criteria include the FOX Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System; the Biological Detection System; and the Stryker family of armored combat vehicles.