Was 'reasonable doubt' misworded?

The concept of proving to a jury that someone is innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the most fundamental tenets of the U.S. justice system.

But does the choice of words really matter when a judge chooses to remind a jury that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt before finding someone guilty? It does, according to an attorney for a man convicted by a jury in 2002 of two counts of sexual assault.

An attorney for German Cruz Reyes argued before the Utah Supreme Court this past week that his client's constitutional rights were violated when a trial judge misworded a jury instruction about the meaning of reasonable doubt.

Reyes was convicted by a jury of raping an 18-year-old woman outside a Salt Lake night club in November 2002. Reyes was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 15 years to life for the alleged crime.

Attorney Kent Hart argued before the Supreme Court that the trial judge poorly worded the weight of the state's burden of proof against Reyes and confused the jury. The jury was told that reasonable doubt, the burden in which the state must prove guilt, was "not doubt which is merely possible." Hart argued that although the Constitution does not require a judge to specifically word reasonable doubt in jury instructions, the judge did not properly define the term.

Assistant Attorney General Fred Voros argued that Hart was arguing over the nuance of words, when the concept is clearly spelled out in the Constitution: A person is innocent unless the state can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Utah Court of Appeals sided with Reyes and found the trial judge's jury instruction did not fully define the weight of the state's burden of proof.

Hart said under the judge's instruction, "The jury is forced to make a logical leap," and may conclude that Reyes himself may have some form of legal burden to prove his innocence.

"I'm sorry, but I'm not finding much of a leap," said Supreme Court Chief Justice Christine Durham.

Justice Michael Wilkins said he frankly did not see how regular citizens, with no formal training in the law, were going to notice the difference in the wording to make any significant change.

Hart also argued the judge gave the instruction before evidence was presented but did not repeat the instruction after evidence and before the jury was sent to deliberate. Wilkins noted at times repeating jury instructions may further confuse jurors and take their mind off the evidence at hand.

As far as reasonable doubt, Wilkins said the concept is fairly straightforward in that the state has the job of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The justices took the arguments into consideration and will issue a ruling in the coming weeks.

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E-mail: gfattah@desnews.com