Pentagon inspectors say police, firefighters and doctors are still inadequately prepared to respond to attacks using weapons of mass destruction against Army bases — even though the Army had tried, in vain, to improve that after the 9/11 attacks.

"Plans to implement an Installation Preparedness Program for first responders were substantially fragmented and ineffective," according to an Army Audit Agency report, obtained by the Deseret Morning News through a Freedom of Information Act request.

That report, however, is now 11 months old — and the Army, in written responses, said it has been taking numerous steps to improve the situation since it was issued.

The report noted that efforts to improve emergency response plans had their roots in a survey of bases back in 2000, which concluded "that installation first responders weren't adequately equipped, trained or funded to respond to all facets of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and/or high-yield explosive incident."

So in May 2001, the Army wrote to base commanders outlining "eight critical tasks" they should pursue to improve that. After the 9/11 attacks further increased worry about terrorism, the Army in January 2002 revised rules to clarify who was in charge of different facets of first responder training and equipment .

The new report looked at how well resulting training and equipment purchases have worked, both for military and civilian first responders. Inspectors said it was "fragmented," "ineffective" and "not adequate."

For example, the report complained that one set of Army officials and rules oversaw police; another set of officials and rules governed firefighters; and a third, separate set oversaw medical personnel.

Inspectors said that not only did those groups not coordinate with each other, they often failed to consult special response teams and other Army experts on biological, chemical and radiological weapons to develop training criteria and equipment lists.

Inspectors said while the Army had meant to separate and assign key roles to ensure they were accomplished, "the unintended result was a lack of coordination and communication between key Army proponents and technical experts to collectively address installation preparedness issues related to first responders. Additionally, some of the Army's available expertise was underused."

Inspectors called for appointment of one office to oversee all such efforts to ensure better coordination. In response, the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff said its Installation Preparedness Branch has been assigned that responsibility. It also planned conferences to bring together all major players to coordinate.