Pakistan hasn't right to N-secrets

ISTANBUL — My father, Dr. Mujaddid Ahmed Ijaz, was an early pioneer in Pakistan's "Atoms for Peace" cooperative nuclear program with the United States during the late 1960s. One of the most vivid memories I have of him was the stream of tears flowing down his cheeks as our Pakistan International Airlines Boeing 707 took off from Karachi Airport in the winter of 1972.

It would be our last visit to Pakistan as children. I returned to Islamabad in the summer of 1992, the year my father died, to receive the condolences of his colleagues, former students and friends at Pakistan's key nuclear laboratories. When I asked him a few months before he died why he had become so emotional that day on the plane, he told me it had to do with the deep regret he had felt for not being able to move our family back to Pakistan and fulfill his dream of helping his country become a peaceful nuclear power, one whose only use of nuclear weapons would be for self-defense.

On Jan. 20, 1972, my father (then a tenured physicist at Virginia Tech and senior research scientist at the Oak Ridge National Labs in Tennessee), along with 300 of Pakistan's best nuclear physicists and engineers had been summoned home from around the world by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They came to a rural Pakistani town where Bhutto ordered them to "build me a bomb." He vowed to "eat grass," if necessary, to make Pakistan a nuclear power.

And so began one of history's most defiant and notorious efforts to set up a worldwide clandestine network aimed at purchasing, copying, even stealing whatever was necessary to get the technology that would yield the Muslim world's first functional nuclear weapons. These efforts ended in humiliation and disgrace last week when Abdul Qadeer Khan, the metallurgist who allegedly first stole blueprints for Pakistan's uranium enrichment centrifuges from a Dutch nuclear consortium in 1975, admitted to selling state secrets and technology based on those designs to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Libya's revelations in particular show that Khan shared not only centrifuge designs but also warhead components and bombmaking blueprints based on China's 1960s-era weapons. The evidence, now in U.S. hands, is an alarming development because it demonstrates Khan's intent to distribute the Islamic bomb, not just to help Muslim countries build nuclear-fuel plants.