My provisional bottom line today: Iraq intended to develop biological weapons. Clearly, research and development work was under way that would have permitted a rapid shift to agent production if seed stocks were available. But we do not yet know if production took place. And just as clearly, we have not yet found biological weapons.

Before I leave the biological weapons story, an important fact that you must consider: For years the U.N. searched unsuccessfully for Saddam's biological weapons program. His son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, who controlled the hidden program, defected and only then was the world able to confirm that Iraq indeed had an active and dangerous biological weapons program.

Indeed, history matters when dealing with these complicated problems. While many of us want instant answers, the search for biological weapons in Iraq will take time and it will take patience.

Let me now turn to chemical weapons.

We said in the estimate with high confidence that Iraq had them. We also believed, though with less certainty, that Saddam had stocked at least 100 metric tons of agent.

That may sound like a lot, but it would fit in a few dorm rooms on this campus. And the last time I remember, they're not very big rooms.

Initially, the community was skeptical about whether Iraq had started chemical weapons agent production. Sources had reported that Iraq had begun renewed production and imagery and intercepts gave us additional concerns. But only when analysts saw what they believed to be satellite photos of shipments of materials from ammunition sites did they believe that Iraq was again producing chemical weapons agents.

What do we know today?

The work done so far shows a story similar to that of his biological weapons program. Saddam had rebuilt a dual-use industry. David Kay reported that Saddam and his son Uday wanted to know how long it would take for Iraq to produce chemical weapons.

However, while some sources indicate Iraq may have conducted some experiments related to developing chemical weapons, no physical evidence has yet been uncovered. We need more time.

My provisional bottom line today: Saddam had the intent and capability to quickly convert civilian industry to chemical weapons production. However, we have not yet found the weapons we expected.

I have now given you my provisional bottom lines, but it is important to remember that estimates are not written in a vacuum. Let me tell you some of what was going on in the fall of 2002.

Several sensitive reports crossed my desk from two sources characterized by our foreign partners as established and reliable. The first from a source who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle said Iraq was not in the possession of a nuclear weapon. However, Iraq was aggressively and covertly developing such a weapon.